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ABSTRACT
The military supply chain must explore initiatives to improve its ability to meet warfighter
needs. One initiative, developed during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the pure pallet
process—by consolidating material early in the supply chain into user-specific pallets, these
pallets are able to transit the defense transportation system without being broken down en
route, theoretically arriving to the warfighter in less time than prior break-bulk methods
required. The pure pallet initiative’s effectiveness and efficiency was assessed by measuring
customer requisition wait time, cargo throughput, and revenue performance. It was found
that effectiveness increased, without corresponding losses in efficiency.

BACKGROUND
Initial analyses show that the defense
transportation system has not yet fully learned
the logistics lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. A
December 2003 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report investigating the
preliminary effectiveness of Operation Enduring
Freedom identified what it termed as
“substantial logistics support problems” (Solis
2003). In particular, the GAO identified
18
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“[insufficient and ineffective theater distribution
capability” as a major problem. They state “[t]he
distribution of supplies was also delayed because
cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets
had to be separated and repackaged several
times for delivery to multiple units in different
locations” (Solis, 2003, p. 3).
In 1993, the defense transportation system
stakeholders also recognized that improvements
to the supply chain were critical to expedite the

flow of material to the warfighter and to relieve
congestion at the aerial ports of debarkation
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Kuntz, 2004).
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, improvements
in the supply chain focused primarily on the link
between the factory and the ports of debarkation.
The rapid movements by combat forces during
the Iraq war taught military logisticians the
critical need to streamline the flow from the
debarkation ports to the warfighter—“the last
tactical mile” as well (Bivona et al., 2004, p. 76).
Establishing the Pure Pallet Process
In July 2003, a Defense Distribution Center
representative visited Kuwait to reviewr Central
Command’s distribution system and assist in
identifying areas of improvement. It was
discovered that the method employed to
consolidate material and build pallets in the
U.S.-based consolidation and containerization
points was creating a substantial backlog of
pallets upon arrival at the debarkation ports and
theater distribution center due to the high
volume of material and excessive handling
requirements of pallets arriving into the theater.
An important consequence of the saturation was
the substantial increase in the warfighter’s wait
time for supplies at the “point of the spear”
(Hornung, 2004). A more alarming concern was
that soldiers were unnecessarily being placed in
harm’s way—the process of breaking down,
sorting, and rebuilding pallets made soldiers
vulnerable to attack (Diamond, 2004; Imberi,
2004; Merriweather, 2005).
In October 2003, Defense Distribution Center
staff sponsored a meeting among the defense
transportation system supply chain stake
holders. The team determined that requisitioned
material should be held as far back in the supply
chain as possible where the infrastructure was in
place to efficiently hold and consolidate it. The
ideal locations to position the cargo were
determined to be the U.S.-based containerization
points: the Defense Distribution Depot Susque
hanna, the Defense Distribution Depot Red
River, and the Defense Distribution Depot San
Joaquin (Hornung, 2004).

The team also elected to build the consolidated
material at the containerization points into enduser specific pallets called pure pallets. By
consolidating material into pure pallets, the
material would flow to the warfighter without
being broken-down en route. This is unlike the
historical process, which was based on breakbulk pallets that were broken down in-theater
and the material sorted and re-palletized before
being moved forward to the warfighter (Kuntz,
2004). This new approach seemed logical—the
open desert environment and chronic lack of
personnel certified to build air pallets made the
theater distribution centers better suited for
pallet cross-docking than for break-bulk
activities and pallet construction.
Air Mobility Command’s Air Transportation
Division planners then defined a pure pallet as
“...a pallet, which contains only shipments for
the end-users at a single military destination.
They also realized that certain low-volume
destinations would be inefficient. Therefore they
stipulated that in some instances the historical
approach could be used, by combining specific
users with a designated single or lead
destination. Pallets constructed in this way are
said to be mixed pallets. Pallets were to be
capped when sufficient cargo was available to fill
the pallet, or when the oldest piece of cargo
reached a hold time of 48 hours.
In November 2003 the pure pallet process was
placed into action at the Susquehanna depot. In
support of Central Command’s route plan,
Susquehanna established 47 pure pallet build
lanes to service 47 associated destinations. In
addition, the Army’s maximum allowable cargo
hold time was increased from 48 hours to 120
hours and the Marine Corps’ cargo hold time wras
increased from 48 hours to 72 hours (Hornung,
2004). It was assumed that the increased cargo
collection time would allow a sufficient volume of
cargo to flow into the consolidation points to
enable the pure pallets to meet or exceed the
ideal 1.5 ton pallet weight previously established
by regulations (Air Mobility Command, 2001).
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In February 2004, the pure pallet process was
expanded to include pure pallet construction at
Charleston and Dover Air Force bases (Hornung,
2004). These aerial ports were ideal due to their
location in the defense transportation system
supply chain, which allowed them to collect and
consolidate Central Command-destined material
that had bypassed the containerization points.
This initiative is still new and is continuing to
evolve rapidly. While the initial assessments
were positive, they were largely based on
opinion. The research goal was therefore to
objectively study the process, using specific
criteria for effectiveness (requisition wait time)
and for efficiency (monthly tonnage and
transportation revenue performance).
DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
VS. COMMERCIAL PRACTICE
When considering the challenges facing the
defense transportation system, it is easy to
assume that it should operate much like its
commercial counterparts. Upon closer investiga
tion, several key differences are readily
identifiable. A paper by the University of Penn
sylvania’s Wharton School notes that the
military supply chain can be categorized as three
distinct chains, involving commodities, major
components and people (Wharton, 2003). The
Wharton paper also highlights the seriousness of
military supply—a retail outlet may suffer lost
sales if supply runs out but in the military,
soldiers can be killed if their on-hand stocks of
fuel or munitions are exhausted. Some principal
differences between commercial transportation
and its defense counterpart follow.
Scale and Size
In Fiscal Year 2004, Air Mobility Command
moved approximately 1.15 billion pounds
(Derick, 2005), while FedEx shipped 1.2 billion
packages amounting to more than 3.9 billion
pounds during the same timeframe (Federal
Express, 2004). Where the average FedEx
package weighs approximately 3 pounds, Air
Mobility Command often moves much heavier
items. Furthermore, commercial companies such
20
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as FedEx and UPS limit their maximum pallet
weights to approximately 2,200 pounds (Federal
Express, 2004), while the Air Mobility Command
Weekly Summary Reports indicate that their
average pallet weighs between 3,000 and 5,000
pounds. Finally, Air Mobility Command must be
equally adept at moving non-palletized cargo
such as rolling stock, where the commercial
companies need not be.
Predictability and Volatility
The defense transportation system challenge is
not one of volume as much as of being able to
meet the unpredictability and volatility brought
about by global events. Companies such as
FedEx and UPS are concerned with steady
growth and profitability as goals that are
realized by increasing efficiency, productivity,
and market share (Robbins et al., 2004, p. 11).
While the defense transportation system is also
concerned with efficiency, it is more important
that the system be able to respond to a large
uncertainty of demand and be able to meet the
needs of the warfighters, regardless of
profitability. Robbins and his colleagues note
that “The defense distribution system must
deliver to places that profit-maximizing
commercial firms might never visit, and it must
procure and hold low-demand items that would
never be cost-justified in the commercial sector”
(Robhins et ah, 2004, p. 12).
Commercial “Rainbow” Pallets vs. the
Military Pure Pallet
The commercial mixed pallet, also known as a
rainbow pallet, provides multiple products to a
single customer on a single pallet (Schultz, 2003,
p. 2). Rainbow pallets were developed because
merchandisers demanded more frequent de
liveries and bought smaller quantities, delivered
to their door on a just-in-time basis. This
requirement has become more widespread to
include most industries serving the retail trades,
resulting in intense pressure to “do or die”
(Hammond, 1999, p. 2).
By purchasing “the right amount of goods”,
which is usually less than a full pallet, the

merchandiser customer is not required to
maintain additional warehouse space to store
excess product. Their challenge is to determine
whether the increased transportation cost of
more frequent deliveries outweighs the cost of
excessive inventory and warehousing if rainbow
pallets are not used. In contrast, the pure pallet
process designers must consider more than just
the velocity at which material reaches the
warfighter. The pure pallet process must also
accommodate the proper balance between
process effectiveness (i.e., velocity), and process
efficiency (i.e., acceptable use of scarce
transportation assets). For example, standard
commercial shipping pallets are typically low
cost wooden items that can be easily obtained.
Furthermore, the transportation assets
themselves—typically trucks—are also widely
available. Distributors can secure additional
trucking if necessary, and the customer needs
only to accept the additional cost as a tradeoff for
velocity. In contrast, military airlift aircraft and
pallets are scarce, and wartime pallet attrition is
significant. Peterson notes that of the more than
180.000 standard “463-L” military airlift pallets
available prior to September 2001, only about
85.000 were accounted for by December 2004.
The pallets themselves are costly to buy and
maintain: the Air Force spent almost $24 million
for 463-L pallet repairs in 2004 (Peterson, 2005,
p. 31).
The pure pallet concept is similar to the
commercial industry’s rainbow pallet, in that the
defense transportation system must also balance
tradeoffs of velocity versus transportation cost,
warehousing space, and inventory. The key
difference is that the pure pallet process is made
considerably more complicated by the additional
constraints of limited airlift assets.
Before explaining the research methodology, a
brief discussion of effectiveness and efficiency
metrics is necessary. To measure defense
transportation system effectiveness, requisition
wait time—the time that elapses from an item’s
order to the date it is received—was a clear
choice (see e.g., Solis, 2005, p. 19). To assess
efficiency, the measure used is cargo throughput,

in terms of both pallet loading and aircraft
usage. The hypothesis was that the time
criterion for capping pure pallets would lead to
lighter average pallet loads, which in turn would
lead to lighter, less efficient aircraft loads. Pallet
weight computations would be straightforward
due to the standard 463-L pallet specification,
but a corresponding aircraft usage metric was
needed that could be readily applied across the
multiple aircraft types used by Air Mobility
Command. Fortunately, Air Mobility Command
already uses precisely such an efficiency
measure: the percent Transportation Working
Capital Fund (% TWCF) goal.
The Transportation Working Capital
Fund (TWCF)
Title IV, Section 405, of the National Security
Act of 1947, Working Capital Funds, authorizes
the use of revolving accounts to finance certain
commercial-type activities in the Department of
Defense. Airlift services reimbursement is
received by the TWCF from authorized airlift
customers by charging tariffs based on the type
of airlift service provided. These tariffs are
developed by U.S. Transportation Command
planners and approved by the Undersecretary of
Defense, Comptroller, through the President’s
Budget Cycle. Revenues earned by the TWCF
recoup direct and indirect costs, general and
administrative support provided by others,
depreciation, and amortization costs incurred by
Air Mobility Command in providing airlift
services (Air Mobility Command, 2004, p. 7).
TWCF airlift tariffs for routine passengers and
cargo are set annually based on commercial
competition or a standard rate per mile. As a
result, the TWCF doesn’t recover full costs due to
Air Mobility Command’s requirement to main
tain the wartime capacity of the airlift system.
The difference between the revenue that the
TWCF receives and the costs incurred for these
airlift services is offset by an Air Force
operations and maintenance-funded readiness
account (Air Mobility Command, 2004, p. 8).
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Air Mobility Command’s Financial Management
and Comptroller division determines the stan
dard aircraft usage level for passengers and
cargo to meet the Transportation Working Fund
Goal. The goal is for the Air Force to provide a
service to the customer cheaper than they can
buy it commercially. In order to remain com
petitive the Air Force accepts some financial loss
on each flight. The TWCF goal is set to defer
most, but not all of the cost (Hobin, 2005). For
example, in March 2005 the percent TWCF goal
was 49.8% for passengers and 63.3% for cargo
(Hobin, 2005). Therefore in March 2005, if an
airlift aircraft was loaded to 63.3% of its cargo
capacity, then it met its TWCF goal. When Air
Mobility Command exceeds the TWCF goal, then
they are operating cheaper than their com
mercial competition and they are operating
efficiently by exceeding the expected TWCF
input (Hobin, 2005).
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
To examine pure pallet impacts to defense
transportation system efficiency and effective
ness, a case study of airlift-based material
support to Central Command was conducted,
comparing pre-pure pallet throughput (denoted
as “historical” throughput) versus pure pallet
throughput into the Central Command theater.
Requisition wait time, average pallet weight and
percent Transportation Capital Working Fund
(%TWCF) goal-per-mission metrics were used to
compare historical (March 2003-February 2004)
pallet data to pure pallet (March 2004—January
2005) data.
Qualitative sources included published
interviews and communications with military
personnel involved in pure pallet implementa
tion. Quantitative data sources included the
RAND DOD-wide distribution database (for
requisition wait time), Air Mobility Command’s
Weekly Summaries for the Charleston and Dover
Air Force Base aerial ports (for pallet weights),
and Air Mobility Command’s Tanker Airlift
Control Center end-of-month reports for Charles
ton and Dover Air Force Bases (for % TWCF
goal). This article focused on the Dover and
22
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Charleston aerial ports because virtually all
Central Command-designated pure pallets
transit these two ports.
Requisition Wait Time
Figure 1 shows how the monthly pure pallet
mean requisition wait times compare to the
historical method, for cargo palletized at Dover
or Charleston (denoted as “MILAIR” pallets).
Figure 2 depicts the same information, for cargo
palletized by the Defense Logistics Agency at the
Susquehanna, Red River, or San Joaquin depots
(denoted as “MILALOC” pallets). To ensure an
accurate picture is presented, the tonnage of
material transported into the Central Command
theater is also shown in each figure, as is the
Army’s maximum 20-day requisition wait time
goal. The associated data is shown in the
Appendix. Note that for the Central Command
MILAIR requisition wait times, the historical
mean and median were 35.2 days and 30.1 days,
respectively, while the pure pallet initiative
mean and median values were 31.3 and 25.5
days, respectively. Using a two-sample t-test
assuming unequal variance, it was found that
the difference in mean requisition wait times is
statistically significant (p = 0.048). Average
monthly cargo throughput was about 10,500 tons
across both timeframes.
Figure 2 shows that the historical mean and
median Central Command MILALOC requisition
wait times were 27.6 days and 23 days,
respectively, while the corresponding pure pallet
initiative mean and median values decreased to
23.5 and 19.8 days. The difference in mean
requisition wait times is statistically significant
(p = 0.006). Average monthly volume was again
about 10,500 tons across the entire period.
Similar findings were reported in a GAO report
by Solis from data collected since February 2005
(Solis, 2005). These trends suggest that the pure
pallet initiative is helping to reduce Central
Command customer wait time.

FIGURE 1
REQUISITION WAIT TIME, PALLETS BUILT AT DOVER OR CHARLESTON

FIGURE 2
REQUISITION WAIT TIME,
PALLETS BUILT BY SUSQUEHANNA, RED RIVER, OR SAN JOAQUIN DEPOTS
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Pure Pallet Weight
Figure 3 compares the average pallet tonnage for
Dover AFB both before and after pure pallet
implementation. The Missions numbers were
generated from the reported data for the three
primary airlift assets, the C-5, C-17, and the
B747 as shown in the Appendix, records 1
through 4, 9 and 10. Figure 4 provides similar
insights for Charleston AFB—the associated
data is in the Appendix, records 5 through 8, 11
and 12.
Dover Throughput. The historical average
Dover AFB pallet weighed 1.4 tons, but
increased to an average of 1.76 tons for port-built
(MILA1R) pure pallets. The MILALOC pure
pallets transiting Dover averaged 1.6 tons.
Taken together, Dover MILAIR and MILALOC
pure pallets averaged 1.68 tons. The difference
in mean tonnage, historical versus combined
MILAIR and MILALOC pallets, is statistically
significant (p = 0.0004). The average number of
airlift missions through Dover AFB was 107 per
month during the historical period, but
decreased slightly to 102 per month during the
pure pallet period.
Charleston Throughput. MILAIR pallets built
at Charleston increased from 1.9 tons average
weight to 2.13 tons after pure pallet implementa
tion. The MILALOC pure pallet weight averaged
1.73 tons. Overall, MILAIR and MILALOC pure
pallets together averaged 1.93 tons per pallet.
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Charleston averaged about 139 Central Com
mand airlift missions per month during the
historical period, but dropped to 105 per month
during the pure pallet timeframe. Note that
while the difference in mean tonnage, historical
versus MILAIR pallets is statistically significant
(p = 0.017), the difference in mean tonnage,
historical versus combined MILAIR and
MILALOC pallets is not (p = 0.33).
In summary, the pure pallet process appears to
be helping increase average pallet weight—at
the least, average pallet weight has not declined
since the process was adopted. One might argue
that the pure pallet initiative is affecting the
number of monthly airlift missions, given their
decrease during the study period, but this is
unlikely. Too many other factors are also
involved, such as competition for airlift aircraft
for other missions, poor weather, and customer
demand.
Percent TWCF Revenue Performance
Figures 5 and 6 compare the average %TWCF
per month for Dover and Charleston Air Force
Bases before and after pure pallet implementa
tion. Both the missions and the %TWCF were
generated from the reported data for the three
primary airlift assets, the C-5, C-17, and the
B747. The Appendix contains the applicable
statistical measurements: refer to records 9, 10,
13, and 14 for Figure 5, and records 11, 12, 15,
and 16 for Figure 6.

FIGURE 3
AVERAGE PALLET WEIGHT
DOVER AIR FORCE BASE

FIGURE 4
AVERAGE PALLET WEIGHT, CHARLESTON AIR FORCE BASE
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FIGURE 5
AVERAGE PERCENT TRANSPORTATION WORKING
CAPITAL FUND REVENUES, DOVER AIR FORCE BASE

FIGURE 6
AVERAGE PERCENT TRANSPORTATION WORKING CAPITAL FUND REVENUES,
CHARLESTON AIR FORCE BASE
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During the March 2003-February 2004 historical
period, Dover AFB averaged 106.7 percent
TWCF revenues per month, but increased to an
average 112.5 percent after pure pallet imple
mentation. The statistical significance between
the historical versus pure pallet %TWCF
revenue performance is somewhat weak (p =
0.076). In contrast, Charleston AFB averaged
143.1% TWCF during the historical period, but
declined slightly to 137% TWCF after the pure
pallet process was initiated. This difference is
statistically significant (p = 0.045). Overall, there
appears to be a mild negative impact on the
%TWCF revenue per mission. However, the
%TWCF revenue continued to easily exceed the
Air Mobility Command goal after the pure pallet
process was implemented.
CONCLUSIONS
Pure pallet process implementation appears not
to have reduced the defense transportation
system’s efficiency in the Central Command area
of responsibility and in most circumstances is
correlated with improved system effectiveness.
The defense transportation system might never
be fully optimized, but by continuing to imple
ment ground-breaking initiatives along with
lessons learned from commercial industry, the
Department of Defense is making strides toward
becoming a truly seamless end-to-end supply
chain.
This research has shown that the pure pallet
concept is correlated with increased velocity of
material to Central Command warfighters, at

minimal impact to transportation system
efficiency. However, pure pallets are probably
not a panacea for all military material distribu
tion situations. For example, pure pallets
increase the workload in the earlier stages of the
supply chain (Robb, 2004, p. 22). Therefore, in
situations such as a stable theater with a mature
logistics system in a non-combat environment,
the trade-off between velocity and increased
workload may not be acceptable, such as in nonmilitary sectors. It does, however, have potential
application in disaster response situations.
Future research will investigate pallet attrition
and retrograde issues, which was a significant
challenge before the pure pallet concept was
initiated. The pure pallet concept may be
exacerbating the problem—during historical
breakbulk pallet operations, the pallets would be
broken down at the points of debarkation and
the material loaded on trucks for delivery to the
warfighters, leaving the 463-L airlift pallets and
associated netting for return to the U.S. In
contrast, the pure pallet concept pushes the
airlift pallets much closer to the warfighter,
rendering pallet retrograde more difficult.
Other research will address the 72 and 120-hour
hold times that were established early in the
pure pallet process formation, with little or no
available data. Sufficient data now exists to
determine optimal hold times. Hopefully, these
hold times can be reduced without system
efficiency impacts.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL SUMMARIES
Pallet Tonnage Historical (DOV
Mar 03 - Feb 04)

1

Missions Pre-Pure Pallet (DOV
Mar 03 - Feb 04)

9

Mean

1 40

Mean

1 90

Mean

0 04

Standard Error

0 04

Standard Error

Median

1 44

Median

1 86

Median

#N/A

Mode

#N/A

0 14

Standard Deviationi

0 14

Standard Deviation

Sample Variance

0 02

Sample Variance

0 02

Sample Vanance

Kurtosis

0 05

Kurtosis

Skewness

0 06

Skewness

0 96

Skewness

Range

0 49

Range

0 41

Range

Minimum
Maximum

1 19

Minimum
Maximum

1 67
16 85

Count

Sum
Count

12

Pallet Tonnage Port F*ure (DOV
Mar 04 - Jan 05)

6

10

Mean

1 76

Mean

2.13

Mean

0 11

Standard Error

0.09

Standard Error

1 71

Median

2 11

Median

Mode

#N/A

Mode

#N/A

Mode

Standard Deviation

0 37

Standard Deviation

0.30

Standard Deviation

Sample Vanance

0.14

Sample Variance

0 09

Sample Variance

Kurtosis

0 79

Kurtosis

Skewness

0 14

Skewness

0.31

Skewness

Range

1 02

Range

1 05

Range

Kurtosis

Minimum
Maximum
Sum

-1 30

Minimum

1.25

Maximum

2 27

Sum

19 31

Count

11

Pallet Tonnage MILALOC
(DOV Mar 04- Jan 05)

1 67

11

7

Pallet Tonnage MILALOC
(CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05)

11

10 0

Sample Variance

99 9

-0 4

Range

38 2

77

Minimum
Maximum
Sum

Mean

102

Median

100

Mode

#N/A
17

Sample Vanance

1

Kurtosis

0

Skewness
Range

61

Minimum

72

Maximum

133

Sum

1119

15

Mean

1 60

Mean

1 73

Mean

0 04

Standard Error

0 05

Standard Error

Median

1 64

Median

1 77

Median

142

Median

Mode

1 64

Mode

1 86

Mode

127

Mode

Standard Deviation

0 15

Standard Deviation

0 15

Standard Deviation

Sample Vanance

0 02

Sample Variance

0 02

Sample Variance

Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.24
-0 81
0 48
1.30
1 78
17 60
11

Average Pure Pallet Tonnage
(DOV Mar 04 - Jan 05)

Kurtosis

Kurtosis

Skewness

-1.01

Skewness

Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0 41

Range

Maximum

1 87

Sum

11

Average Pure Pallet Tonange
8
(CHS Mar 04 -,Jan 05)

12

1 68

Mean

1 93

Mean

Standard Error

0 06

Standard Error

0 07

Standard Error

Median

1 66

Median

1 86

Median

Mode

1 48

Mode

1 69

Mode

Standard Deviation

0 29

Standard Deviation

0 31

Standard Deviation

Sample Vanance

0 08

Sample Variance

0.10

Sample Variance

Mean

1

Skewness

92
205

12

Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

105
4
107
#N/A

Mean

Median
Mode

13
176

Standard Deviation
Sample Vanance

Kurtosis

0 78

Kurtosis

Skewness

0 78

Skewness

-1

Skewness

Range

1.26

Range

42

Range

Minimum
Maximum
Sum

1 46
2 72
42 41

Minimum
Maximum
Sum

157 0

12

0

77
119
1157

137 0

Standard Error

1 02
1.25

130 8

17172

XTWCF Post-Pure Pallet (CHS
16
Mar 04 - Jan 05)

0 68

2.27

02
26 2

Count

0 19

36 91

7 7

2

Kurtosis

Maximum

#N/A

-06

Range
Minimum

2 2
142 8

Standard Deviation

Skewness

Sum

143 1

Standard Error

58 7

Missions Post-Pure Pallet
(CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05)

Mean

11

Kurtosis

1667

Count

99 6
131 6
1237 7

Sample Vanance

113

Minimum

1 46

19 01

1.2
0 8
32 0

% TWCF Pre-Pure Pallet (CHS
Mar 03 - Feb 04)

Standard Error

Kurtosis

8 9
79 0

Count

11

29

2 7
110 9
#N/A

Standard Deviation

274

847

112 5

Standard Error

5

8

12

%TWCF Post-Pure Pallet (DOV
Mar 04 ■ Jan 05)

14

139

86 6
124 7
1280 2

Count

12

Missions Pre-Pure Pallet (CHS
Mar 03 - Feb 04)

-0.16

0 8

Kurtosis
Skewness

155

Count

Standard Deviation

1

1287

Minimum

Sum

2 9
108 1
#N/A

0

78

Maximum

2 72
23 40

Count

23

Missions Post-Pure Pallet
(DOV Mar 04 ■ Jan 05)

Standard Error
Median

120

Mode

Count

12

Pallet Tonnage Port Built Pure
(CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05)

Median

509

Maximum
Sum

106 7

Standard Error

100

Minimum

1 74
2 16
22.76

% 7WCF Pre-Pure Pallet (DOV
Mar 03 - Feb 04)

Mean

7

Kurtosis

-0 36

13

107

Mode

Standard Deviation

Sum

\

Pallet Tonnage Historical
(CHS Mar 03 - Feb 04)

Standard Error

Mode

!

5

Kurtosis

Minimum
Maximum
Sum

26
139 8
#N/A
8.7
75 6
-0 7
-0.2
292
121 7
150 9
1507 0
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